

Cyber Resilience Approaches for Cyber Physical Systems

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Abstract: *Cyber-physical systems (CPS) integrate physical processes with computing, communication, and control systems to increase efficiency, reliability, and safety. However, these systems are also vulnerable to cyber attacks, which could have severe consequences, such as loss of life, property damage, and economic disruption. To ensure the safety and security of modern society, it is crucial to ensure that CPS are cyber-resilient, meaning they can continue to function and recover from cyber attacks. This requires a multi-faceted approach that includes secure design, risk assessment, monitoring and response, redundancy and backup, and training and education. By implementing these strategies, organizations can improve the cyber resilience of their CPS, reducing the risk of cyber attacks and promoting the safety and security of modern society.*

Keywords: Cyber Attacks, CPS, Physical Components, Risk Assessment

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